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On 18 January 2018, the Institute of China Studies (ICS) of 
the University of Malaya co-organized with Nanhua University of 
Taiwan an International Workshop titled “Taiwan’s New 
Southbound Policy in Comparative Perspective.” 7 speakers 
from Malaysia, Mainland China, Taiwan and India presented 
their papers in this workshop. 
In the first panel on the political economy of Taiwan’s New 
Southbound Policy, Professor Day Dong-Ching of Nanhua 
University presented a paper titled “Asia-Pacific Economic 
Integration and Its Challenges to Taiwan: From the Perspective 
of Identity.” Professor Day argues that identity is a major factor 
driving economic regionalism and Taiwan would have to 
overcome the challenges post by the identity issue. Dr Ma Bo of 
Nanjing University then analyzed Taiwan’s New Southbound 
Policy from the Mainland China perspective. He explained that 
the Chinese government does not see this policy as threatening 
but it is meant to promote Taiwan Independence then this could 
be seen as a threat. Dr. Ngeow Chow Bing of ICS discusses the 
implementation of the New Southbound Policy focusing on 
Malaysia, in the economic and cultural sphere. 
The second panel provides a comparative angle by 
examining similar regional initiatives. Professor Zhang 
Yuanpeng from Jiangsu Academy of Social Sciences discussed 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the cross-straits 
cooperation possible under this initiative. Professor Kuo Wu-
Ping of Nanhua University compared the Belt and Road Initiative 
with Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union. Professor Kuo contend 
that BRI has the potential to transform the economic relationship 
between China and member states of Eurasian Economic Union, 
making China their number one economic partner, which could 
undermine Russia’s economic interests. Dr Hoo Chiew-Ping of 
the National University of Malaya analyzed the New 
Southern Policy of the Republic of Korea under President 
Moon Jae-In. She pointed out that Republic of Korea does 
not have a consistent policy towards Southeast Asia. 
However driven by concerns of its relationship with 
Northeast Asian neighbors, President Moon is determined 
to diversify South Korea’s foreign policy focus by engaging 
more with Southeast Asian countries. Finally, Dr Rahul 
Mishra, who is from India and currently attached to the Asia
-Europe Institute of University of Malaya, presented a 
paper on India’s Act East Policy. He outlined the different 
phases of the previous Look East Policy and the new 
measures under the Act East Policy and the prospects of 
greater cooperation between India, Taiwan, and Southeast 
Asian countries. ◆ 
 ICS International Workshop 
“Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy in Comparative Perspective”  
Presenters of the workshop. (From left) Dr. Hoo Chiew Ping, Dr. Dong-Ching Day, Dr. Rahul Misra, Dr. Ngeow Chow Bing, Dr. Wu-Ping Kuo,  
Dr. Zhang Yuanpeng and Dr. Ma Bo. 
Section of audience during the workshop 
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Proposal Workshop  
“Malaysian Voices in the Malaysia-China Relationship” 
ICS organized a proposal workshop on “Malaysian 
Voices in the Malaysia-China Relationship” on 9 March 2018 
with sponsorship from United MAEX Sdn Bhd. The workshop  
brainstormed and solicited opinions and suggestions for a 
research proposal to examine the role of the major Malaysian 
stakeholders in the shaping of Malaysia-China relations. 
Professor Danny Wong Tze-Ken of the University of Malaya 
made a presentation on the different phases of Malaysia-
China historically. Dr Ngeow Chow Bing of ICS discussed the 
role of the Malaysian Rubber Industry community in Malaysia-
China relations, specifically addressing the topic of Rubber 
Diplomacy. Professor Cheong Kee Cheok and Dr. Wang 
Qianyi of University of Malaya and the principal investigators 
of this project discussed the analytical framework and 
research purpose of this project.  
Participants at the workshop 
The sponsors and the presenters of the workshop. From left: Dr. Vincent Kam (Chief Executive Officer of United MAEX Sdn Bhd), Dr. Ngeow Chow 
Bing, Mr. He Yifeng (Co-founder of United MAEX Sdn Bhd), Datuk Professor Dr. Danny Wong Tze Ken, Dr. Cheong Kee Cheok and Ms. Wang Qianyi 
Dr. Cheong Kee Cheok and Ms. Wang Qianyi discussed the 
analytical framework and research purpose 
Tan Sri Koh Tsu Koon raising questions to the speakers 
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International Workshop  
“Facing the North Korea Challenge: Southeast Asia and China ” 
experiences in Pyongyang and the interaction he had 
with North Korean officials. Finally, Lee Jae-Hong from 
the Asan Institute of South Korea presented a 
comprehensive overview of the security relations 
between South Korea and Southeast Asia and how both 
sides can cooperate to manage the North Korea 
challenge.   
On 18 April 2018, the Institute of China Studies (ICS) of 
the University of Malaya co-organized with East Asian 
International Relations (EAIR) CAUCUS, Universiti 
Kebangsaan Malaysia an International Workshop titled 
“Facing the North Korea Challenge: Southeast Asia and 
China”. North Korea’s nuclear and missiles programs have 
been one of the most intricate strategic issues in recent 
years. China is North Korea’s most important neighbor and 
also its economic lifeline, but North Korea has also created 
substantial troublers for China’s geopolitical interests. On the 
other hand, North Korea has maintained various kinds of 
close relationship with Southeast Asian countries.  
This workshop was organized to illustrate the challenges 
in dealing with North Korea, comparing the experiences of 
China and Southeast Asia. Dr Chheang Vanarith of 
Cambodia Institute of Peace and Cooperation reviewed the 
historical ties between Cambodia and North Korea, especially 
the close personal relations between the Cambodian royal 
family and the Kim family in North Korea. In more 
contemporary period, Cambodia continues to be one of the 
major facilitators of North Korea’s international transactions, 
legal and illegal. Vanarith also discusses the importance of 
China factor in Cambodia’s policy towards North Korea.  
Dr Ngeow Chow-Bing from ICS discussed the recent 
developments of China-North Korea relations in light of the 
fluid developments in the Korean peninsula. He argued that 
these developments present both opportunities and 
challenges to China’s strategic interests, and if China does 
not change its North Korea policy, the trajectories of the 
developments may eventually undermine China’s interests. 
Dr Hoo Chiew-Ping from the National University of Malaysia 
discussed North Korea’s relations with Malaysia. Dr Hoo 
discussed the historical background of the relationship and  
the recent turn of events following the assassination of Kim 
Jong-Nam in Malaysia by North Korean operatives, illustrating 
the dilemma the Malaysian government face in engaging the 
erratic North Korean regime. Richard Javad Heydarian, a 
Manila-based academic, recently visited Pyongyang under a 
Southeast Asian think tank delegation. He shared his 
The presenters of the workshop. From left: Dr. Richard Javad Heydarian, Dr. Chheang Vanarith, Dr. Ngeow Chow Bing, Dr. Hoo Chiew Ping and  
Dr. Kim Jong-Nam 
The two panels during the workshop 
China is regarded as the core economic and 
strategic partner as Cambodia is thriving to 
diversify its sources of economic growth, 
modernize and connect its infrastructure, and 
integrate its economy with the region and the 
world at large, said Vannarith Chheang.  
 
Cambodia and China celebrate their 6oth 
anniversary of diplomatic ties this year. Last 
year, President Xi Jinping said, “Both sides 
should take the commemoration of the 60th 
anniversary as an opportunity to promote 
bilateral relations for steady, forward-looking and 
better development.” Prime Minister Hun Sen 
responded, “The Cambodian side is willing to, 
together with the Chinese side, consolidate 
traditional friendship, so as to promote bilateral 
comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership 
for greater development.” 
 
Cambodia, the natural ally of China in the 
region, views the evolving regional order as 
leading to a Sino-centric order. Cambodia’s 
worldview is that the world will become a 
multipolar world in which China is one of the 
main poles. In Asia, China will be a dominant 
major power. In the eyes of the Cambodian 
ruling elites, China will significantly shape global 
and regional order based on China’s evolving 
rules and values. 
 
Cambodia regards China as the most 
important strategic and economic partner, while 
China regards Cambodia as the most reliable 
friend in Southeast Asia. Both countries share a 
historical memory of being humiliated by Western 
powers.  Special personal friendship cultivated 
by Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Premier Zhou 
Enlai in late 1950s is the bedrock of the bilateral 
ties. The personal relationship between the 
leaders of the two countries has been nurtured 
from generation to generation.  
 
China’s support is critical to realizing 
Cambodia’s development vision of becoming a 
middle-income country by 2030 and high-income 
country by 2050. Infrastructure development and 
national and regional connectivity projects are 
the key areas of bilateral cooperation. The flow 
of Chinese investment capital and tourists has 
contributed to socio-economic development and 
poverty reduction in Cambodia.  
 
Historically, Cambodia approached extra-
regional powers to counterbalance against 
existential threats posed by two big immediate 
neighbors. After becoming an ASEAN member in 
1999, Cambodia has become more confident in 
regional integration and community building. The 
non-interference principle and consensus-based 
decision-making mode of ASEAN are the key 
international relations norms that Cambodia can 
rely on to protect itself from its neighbors. 
Although threat perception has gradually 
diminished, Cambodia remain view her 
immediate neighbors as main security and 
sovereignty threats. Territorial disputes between 
Cambodia and its neighbors remain the key 
security concerns. Cambodia-Vietnam territorial 
tension and the flow of Vietnamese migrants to 
Cambodia are the most complex issue, due to 
domestic politics and anti-Vietnam nationalism in 
Cambodia.  
 
The majority of Cambodians still perceive 
Vietnam as the core threat. Cambodian political 
leaders, both from the ruling party and opposition 
party, regard China as the most reliable global 
power to assist Cambodia to counterbalance with 
Thailand and Vietnam, through both economic 
and security means. Hun Sen has shifted his 
political alliance with Hanoi to Beijing, particularly 
since 2010 when Cambodia signed 
comprehensive strategic partnership with China. 
The strategic and political trust that Cambodia 
has earned from China serves as a foundation of 
forging closer ties between the two countries. 
China is now the core backup of Cambodia.  
 
The Cambodian government under the 
leadership of the Cambodian People’s Party 
(CPP) views China as the main source for regime 
legitimization. China’s development aid and 
investments have significantly contributed to the 
output and performance legitimacy of the 
government. From 1994 to 2016, the total 
investment capital from China was about $14.7 
billion, concentrated on four sectors – the 
agriculture and agro-industry, the industrial 
sector, physical infrastructure and services and 
tourism.. Chinese investments to Cambodia are 
mainly driven by deep political trust, cheap labor, 
abundant natural resources, and market access 
to the US, European Union and ASEAN.  
 
The Cambodian government prioritizes output-
based legitimacy (economic growth and 
infrastructure development) over input-based 
legitimacy (democratic participation in 
development and choosing political leadership). 
Cambodia perceives that China’s ‘Belt and Road 
Initiative’ (BRI) will enhance its own infrastructure 
construction and economic development, while 
enhancing its capacity to play more relevant role 
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Cambodian Perspective on China   
Vannarith Chheang  
Chinese President Xi Jinping (R) meets with Cambodian 
Prime Minister Hun Sen in Beijing, capital of China,  
May 17, 2017  
Source: Courtesy of Xinhuanet 
in regional integration and community. Cambodia needs 
about US$700 million per year to develop infrastructure 
such as roads, bridges, power grid, and irrigation system to 
maintain high economic growth.  
 
To sustain its development, Cambodia needs to quickly 
and effectively grasp emerging opportunities deriving from 
ASEAN economic integration, the New Development Bank 
(NDB), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the 
BRI initiative, and other projects and funds including Silk 
Road Fund and China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund. 
Cambodia is capitalizing on these opportunities to 
concretize its development priorities. It hopes that it will be 
able to receive part of these loans for investing in its new 
infrastructure projects. There is a strong belief that BRI will 
reinforce connectivity within the country and connect 
Cambodia with other countries.  
On the South China Sea issue, Cambodia shares similar 
position with China that bilateral mechanism is the most 
effective way in resolving the differences and disputes, and 
ASEAN-China dialogue mechanism is a tool to build mutual 
understanding and trust. The Code of Conduct (COC) is not 
an instrument to resolve conflicts or disputes, but a way to 
build confidence and promote preventive diplomacy. 
Cambodia is not interested in internationalizing the South 
China Sea issue, and is cautiously constraining other 
claimants such as Vietnam and the Philippines from using 
ASEAN to directly counter or challenge China. Cambodia’s 
views and position on the South China Sea have earned 
significant political and strategic capital from China.   
 
Opportunities, however, do not come without challenges. 
The structural challenge that Cambodia may need to 
overcome is power asymmetry. Economic overdependence 
on China poses certain constraints on Cambodia’s foreign 
policy options. Cambodia’s image and role in ASEAN has 
been affected due to its position on the South China Sea, 
which is in line with that of China. The US and Japan have 
expressed their dissatisfaction with Cambodia over the 
South China Sea issue. The US is planning to add a new 
condition to its development assistance to Cambodia by 
requesting Cambodia to take “effective steps to strengthen 
regional security and stability, particularly regarding 
territorial disputes in the South China Sea”.  
 
Chinese economic presence may cause certain public 
discontent if the investment and infrastructure development 
projects are not inclusive - i.e., adversely affecting the local 
livelihood and environment.  Some civil society and grassroots 
organizations have raised concerns with regard to Chinese 
investment projects, particularly with regard to the issues of 
resettlement and compensation, environmental degradation, 
and land grabbing. The public concerns over the influx of 
Chinese investors (especially in casino industry) and tourists to 
Sihanoukville reflect rising public discontent in Cambodia 
against too much, too fast Chinese presence in the Kingdom.  
 
To conclude, Cambodia’s view of China has been 
determined by historical memory, personal friendship, 
imagined shared destiny, economic interests, output legitimacy 
and regime stability, and the perceived threats caused by 
immediate neighbors. Close ties with China present more 
opportunities and benefits than costs and risks. In Phnom 
Penh, China is regarded as the core economic and strategic 
partner, as Cambodia is thriving to diversify its sources of 
economic growth, modernize and connect its infrastructure, 
and integrate its economy with the region and the world at 
large. Betting on China to be a dominant power in Asia has 
also shaped Cambodia’s view and approach towards China .◆  
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Some civil society and grassroots 
organizations have raised concerns with 
regard to Chinese investment projects, 
particularly with regard to the issues of 
reset t lement  and  compensat ion , 
environmental degradation, and land 
grabbing. The public concerns over the 
influx of Chinese investors (especially in 
casino industry) and tourists to 
Sihanoukville reflect rising public discontent 
in Cambodia against too much, too fast 
Chinese presence in the Kingdom. 
Chinese Ambassador to Cambodia Bu Jianguo (front) delivers a 
speech during a handover ceremony of medical equipment to 
Cambodia's Military Hospital in Phnom Penh, Cambodia,  
Dec. 17, 2015.    
Source: Courtesy of Xinhuanet 
 The mainstream narrative, at least outside 
of China, on the recent constitutional 
amendment that removed the term limits of the 
Presidency of the People’s Republic of China, 
has been one of overwhelming disapproval. 
According to this narrative, even before the 
constitutional change Xi Jinping has been as 
power-hungry as Chairman Mao Zedong, 
indicated by the immense consolidation of 
power into his hand and the development of a 
cult of personality. What was assuring was the 
term-limit of the presidency, which was perhaps 
the only institutional check on the power of any 
top Chinese leader. Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao 
both obeyed the term-limit. Succession of 
leadership was made not only possible and 
orderly. Mao-type dictatorship was thought to 
be long-gone. The term-limit, together with 
other written and unwritten rules, represented a 
trend of institutionalization of elite politics in 
China that made the authoritarian system more 
predictable and enduring. Hence, according to 
this narrative, Xi’s removal of the term limit is a 
tremendous setback, and all signs are pointing 
towards Xi becoming the next Mao.  
 Other than Mao, Xi has also been 
compared with Putin, or just some nameless 
Good/Bad Emperors of the past. Essentially, 
Xi’s rule is personalistic and is de-
institutionalizing the political system and is 
dangerous to both China and to the world.  
While there is truth in this narrative, it also 
simplifies the complexity of Chinese elite 
politics and the nature of Xi Jinping’s 
leadership. Many contextual factors are 
ignored, and the dangers are possibly 
exaggerated.  The best reference point to start 
about Xi’s accumulation of power is neither 
Mao Zedong nor Deng Xiaoping, nor Putin; it 
has a lot more to do with the politics during 
Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. 
 
Can Xi accumulate power without the 
support of the Party?  
 The first point about comparison with Mao 
(or Deng) is that Xi Jinping when Xi assumed 
power, he was widely seen as a compromise 
candidate between the so-called Jiang faction 
and Hu faction. Unlike Mao or Deng, Xi 
assumed the top leadership position without 
any revolutionary or state-building credentials; 
in fact some China watchers dismissed him as 
likely a weak leader. Xi’s father was a senior 
figure in the government of Deng era, his 
factional base was not clear, and he had at 
most a solid performance as local and 
provincial career. With such undistinguished 
beginning, Xi went on to become the most 
power leader of China since Mao. It begs the 
question of “how is it possible?”  
The answer could be that Xi was extremely 
skilful in elite politics and in knocking down his 
rivals and concealing these skills before he was 
appointed to the top, and once he was on the 
top he showed his power-hungry side. Or, the 
more likely case is that he is powerful because 
the Party has enabled him to become that 
powerful. Throughout the five years since Xi 
rose to the top, Xi still had to operate within a 
collective leadership system, surrounded by 
powerful officials in their own right. Could Xi 
have just coerced his powerful colleagues into 
acquiescing to his accumulation of power? Or   
could it be the case that Xi got to this stage 
because the Party actually has a consensus to 
enable him to become this powerful. If it is the 
latter, the next question is, why? To answer this 
question, we need to look back to elite politics of 
Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras.  
 
Deng Xiaoping’s rules after the Cultural 
Revolution 
 After experiencing the Cultural Revolution, 
Deng Xiaoping imposed a set of rules, most 
notably ending the life-time tenure of all officials, 
the term-limit for the Presidency and age-limit for 
senior officials and cadres, to prevent another 
possibility of Mao. Over the years, other rules 
developed, so a nascent institutionalization of 
the elite politics was underway. These rules 
included early appointment of potential 
successors into the Politburo Standing 
Committee (PSC), division of labour and power 
within the collective leadership, the balance of 
provincial and factional interests in the 
composition of the Politburo and PSC, the 
regular convening of party congresses and 
plenums at predictable intervals, and so forth. 
These rules, developed by Deng and his 
colleagues, made sense during his time; they 
stabilized the leadership, defined the parameters 
of the game of elite politics, and ensured 
relatively smooth succession processes later. 
But the institutionalization was not complete, 
and one of the most glaring shortcomings was 
the failure to prevent active interference by 
veteran leaders. In Chinese dynastic history, 
there was this tradition of a supposedly Retired 
Emperor (called Taishanghuang) still overseeing 
the works of the Emperor (Emperors Qianlong 
and Jiaqing during the Qing Dynasty being the 
most famous example), making decisive 
intervention when necessary. During the PRC 
era, Mao once ostensibly retired from active 
politics to hand over the government to his 
trusted lieutenants Liu Shaoqi and Deng 
Xiaoping, but in fact continued to intervene. 
Deng ended life-time tenure formally but he 
himself continued to intervene in politics as a 
supposed retired leader. One of his early 
institutional creations was to legitimize the 
interference of veteran leaders –the Central 
Advisory Commission (1982-1992). Some of his 
interventions proved to be a masterful blessing 
of China, most famous of all the Nanxun in 1992, 
but it was still a case of interference 
nonetheless. Jiang Zemin continued the pattern, 
refusing to hand over the Chair of Central 
Military Commission to Hu Jintao until two years 
after he handed over the top party and state 
posts, and afterwards still continued to interfere 
actively during Hu’s era. Term-limit did not 
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prevent this perennial problem of intervention by veteran 
leaders. 
 
Xi’s leadership in the context of Hu Jintao era 
 
 Xi and his generation of leaders benefitted much from 
these rules personally; but they also observed closely how 
these rules became the limitations and could cripple the 
leadership. This was particularly acute in Hu’s era. For the 
first five years of Hu he ruled under the shadow of his 
predecessor Jiang Zemin, and for the next five years he 
ruled under the shadow of his successor, Xi himself. On top 
of that, the collective leadership, designed to overcome 
centralization of power, itself became the basis to develop 
so-called “independent kingdoms” where abuses of power 
were more rampant, the kind shown by the disgraced 
former PSC member Zhou Yongkang and the internal 
security apparatus under his command. In the eyes of Xi 
and the current cohort of party leaders, the rules imposed 
by Deng made sense after the Cultural Revolution years, 
but they have become excessively inhibitive of effective 
leadership over the years. Hu Jintao was weak because of 
these rules. 
 Arguably Hu was unhappy about his weak power but he 
could do nothing about it. He chose to completely retire 
when he handed over all positions to Xi Jinping, and it was 
Hu’s complete retirement that has set the basic stage for Xi 
to consolidate power.  Xi had to clean up the messes 
accumulated during the time of Hu during the first five 
years, but he was very grateful to Hu for setting the 
precedent of ending the active intervention by retired 
leaders. After observing the ills of Hu’s administration, Xi 
and this generation of leaders began to dismantle the rules 
of the Deng era, including overhauling the collective 
leadership system to make it more tightly bounded, and in 
the 19th Party Congress, refusing to appoint successor 
candidates into the PSC. In other words, Xi changed the 
rules and consolidated immense power, but likely with the 
consensus of other party leaders.  
 The removal of the presidential term-limit in this context 
is a logical step. Xi is pursuing an agenda that takes more 
than ten years to complete, including economic 
transformation, the race in AI, Industry 4.0, the Belt and 
Road Initiative, and so forth, and most party leaders are 
behind him on these agenda. If Xi will have to step down in 
2022, he may have the impulse to interfere as a veteran 
leader again. The removal of the term-limit actually allows 
him to see out his agenda legally and formally. In this sense 
it is actually an institutionalization of the political system 
rather than de-institutionalization. Xi is also assembling an 
all-star cast of capable and ambitious officials that has not 
seen in the Hu era, including Liu He, Wang Qishan, Yang 
Jieci, Wang Yang, Wang Huning, and so forth. In the eyes 
of Xi and his colleagues, it would be a pity that they have to 
step down without accomplishing what they want to do 
because of Deng’s era rules.  
 
Removal of term-limit = life-time tenure? 
Finally, the removal of term-limit does not mean life-time 
tenure. By comparing Xi with Mao, many observers are 
assuming that Xi wants to have life-time tenure like Mao 
and other dictators. But Xi may be actually looking at other 
models, those who ruled for a long period of time with both 
legality and legitimacy, and eventually stepped down after 
making achievements. Examples like Mahathir of Malaysia 
(1981-2003) and Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore (1959-1990) 
probably are Xi’s model rather than Mao. There is of course 
the danger of Xi staying indefinitely. But if the thesis of this 
article is correct, that it is essentially the Party that enables 
Xi to become this powerful, than it is likely that in securing 
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Chinese President Xi Jinping waves to deputies to the 13th National 
People's Congress (NPC) in Beijing, capital of China, March 20, 2018.  
Source: Courtesy of Xinhuanet 
The removal of the presidential term-limit in 
this context is a logical step. Xi is pursuing an 
agenda that takes more than ten years to 
complete, including economic transformation, 
the race in AI, Industry 4.0, the Belt and Road 
Initiative, and so forth, and most party leaders 
are behind him on these agenda.   
This article is the personal opinion of the writer. 
the support for removing the term-limit Xi would have to make a 
deal with his colleagues that he will step down after one or two 
more extra terms, probably around 2032, which is about the 
mid-term goal in the drive to achieve socialist modernization. 
Whether such as deal exists or not of course could not be 
verified, but is not far-fetched. ◆ 
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ICS Seminar  
“Belt and Road Initiative: China’s 
Geostrategic Grand Plan or Blue Ocean 
Strategy for Growth? ”  
Mr. Koh King Kee is currently 
the Director of China Belt and 
Road Desk, Baker Tilly 
Advisory Malaysia, an 
accounting and consultancy 
firm in Malaysia. He was 
formerly an Honorary Advisor 
to the Asia Pacific Economic 
Research Institute in Beijing.  
Mr Koh has held senior 
management positions in 
banks, multinationals and 
property development 
companies. He has worked 
for over six years in Beijing, 
including as Chief 
Representative of a Malaysian listed corporation in 
China. In this talk on 13 March 2018, Mr Koh provided an 
alternative to the conventional view that regard the Belt 
and Road Initiative (BRI) as China’s strategic plan 
dominated to challenge US global hegemony and West  
world order. Instead, he sees the BRI as an economically
-driven global development project, unparalleled in 
history in terms of the quantum of investment, that will 
have major impacts on the world economic order. He 
does not discount the strategic implications, but regard 
BRI as primarily driven by China’s own economic 
imperative to move up the global value chain.◆  
Mr. Koh King Kee 
ICS Seminar  
“China’s Wartime Everydayness and the 
Globalization of World War II”  
Professor Hans van de Ven 
(Professor of Modern Chinese 
History, Faculty of  Asian and 
Middle Eastern Studies, 
Cambridge University, Fellow of 
the British Academy), a 
renowned historian on China’s 
military history, presented a 
seminar on 20 April 2018 which 
argues that, from a global 
perspective, violence did not 
really end with the formal 
surrender of Japan in World 
War II. In many parts of the 
colonial world, forces 
empowered and armed in the 
preceding years, continue to fight foreign as well as 
domestic competitors for control of their countries. In 
China, Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists and Mao Zedong’s 
Communists had resumed fighting each other well before 
Japan’s surrender. The number of people there who died 
as a result of war after 1945 was probably as high, if not 
higher, than before 1945. A genuinely global understanding 
of World War II therefore needs to take into account that in 
large parts of the world, societies mobilized not just to 
resist German and Japanese aggression, but also to bring 
the era of Western imperialism to an end and to set 
themselves unto a new course. The seminar also 
discussed Japan’s surrender in China on 9 September 
1945. And the ways in which World War II was experienced 
and imagined in China. ◆  
Professor Hans van de Ven 
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